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This paper investigates the effects of offshoring on individual job satisfaction and 
perceived risk of job loss. The authors merge microdata from the German Socio-economic 
Panel dataset (SOEP) with indicators of insertion in global value chains at the industry 
level for the period 2000–2013. They test two hypotheses. First, the authors investigate 
whether workers in industries with higher offshoring intensity report lower job satisfaction 
and/or are more prone to be unsecure at their jobs. Second, they test whether these effects 
differ among four categories of collars. Their findings indicate that offshoring is 
associated with lower job satisfaction. The results are also indicative of some 
heterogeneity in the offshoring effect, with high skilled white-collar workers being 
mostly unaffected by offshoring and low skilled blue-collar workers showing the largest 
negative effects. Discriminating between manufacturing and services activities, the 
authors find that the extent of heterogeneity and the offshoring effect is relatively larger 
in manufacturing industries. They also find that the effect of offshoring intensity upon 
job satisfaction is more negative and significant in periods of economic decline. Finally, 
the results show that offshoring is not significantly related with job insecurity, a result 
that applies to all workers’ categories. Still, in a period of economic decline job 
insecurity may increase when the offshoring intensity rises. 
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The Great Recession and rise of China in World Trade has raised the debate about the impact of 
trade on wages and employment, in particular in the US (Autor et al., 2013; Feenstra et al., 
2019) but also in Europe. Globalization is frequently blamed for fuelling wage inequality, and a 
flourishing and promising literature intends to gauge the role of trade on different aspects of 
labour markets.  
This paper focusses on a specific aspect of trade globalization, offshoring, and on two 
specific labour market outcomes: individual job satisfaction and perceived job insecurity. The 
paper investigates two hypotheses. First, we wonder whether offshoring intensity affects job 
satisfaction and perceived job insecurity. Second, the paper tests whether the association 
between job satisfaction and perceived job insecurity differs among collars. To that purpose, we 
merge micro data from the 2000–2013 waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) 
with information from the Trade in Value Added (TiVA) database from the OCDE. We use 
industry as matching criterion and therefore combine detailed individual information on 
personal and job characteristics with the offshoring intensity within the industry where the 
individual works. This allows us to estimate a set of job satisfaction and job insecurity equations 
controlling for individual fixed effects and a number of socio-economic and job level 
characteristics. 
Empirical studies have drawn in recent years a complex picture of the effect of the 
internationalisation process on labour markets. Actually, it seems more complicated than ever to 
identify globalisation's winners and losers (Crozet and Orifice, 2017 for a survey) and to isolate 
all the possible links between trade and labour markets. While most research to date has 
focussed on the impact of globalization on wages and inequality (Crinó, 2009, for a review), 
only a few papers have examined the effects of the internalization process on job insecurity and 
none has examined its effects on job satisfaction. The first contribution of this paper is precisely 
to fill this gap. Job satisfaction is an important component of subjective well-being (Van Praag 
and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2008) and is also related to a number of economic outcomes, including 
labour productivity and lower absenteeism (Oswald et al. 2015). However, the literature to date 
has remained silent about the effects of firm internationalization on job satisfaction.1 In this 
paper we hypothesise that even if offshoring does not have direct effects on wages, it can lower 
workers’ job satisfaction by worsening their job conditions, bargaining power and turnover 
rates. 
Job insecurity refers to perceptions of risk and forward-looking labour outcomes. The 
distinction between job insecurity and previous literature focusing on wages and employment 
transitions relies on the notion that future risks can be more damaging to people’s life than real 
events. In fact, concerns about job loss could be as detrimental, if not more, than the actual 
occurrence of job loss (Burgard et al., 2009). Moreover, the perceived rather than the formal job 
insecurity is what matters for workers’ well-being (Jahn, 2015). Apart from this, due to 
globalisation and increasing competition, European labour markets have experienced an 
increasing flexibility, and workers at all levels of the occupational hierarchy have seen their 
_________________________ 
1 The closest question analyzed is whether life satisfaction is positively associated with globalization, broadly 
defined as a concept including economic, social and political aspects (Khun et al., 2015). 
Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 14 (2020–23) 
www.economics-ejournal.org 3 
 
future threatened (László et al., 2010). Therefore, the concepts of job and economic perceived 
insecurity have acquired their own status in the economics literature and are now studied as 
stand-alone subject (Rohde et al., 2017). Earlier studies examining the links between offshoring 
and job risk are based on objective unemployment hazards (Görg and Görlich, 2012 and 2015 
for studies using the same dataset as we do). As far as we know Geishecker et al (2012) is the 
only study that focusses on perceived job fears.2 Our interest in subjective appraisals relies on 
the fact that individual wellbeing is more dependent on ex-ante individual perceptions than on 
ex-ante objective hazards. Moreover, what arguably matters most in terms of public support for 
free trade or wage bargaining are subjective concerns about job security. The underlying 
hypothesis is that in a context of increasing vertical fragmentation of production at the world 
level, trade in intermediate goods may imply more subtle mobility of workers within and among 
sectors, and ultimately can impact the perception of workers regarding the stability of their jobs.  
The second contribution of this study is to test for heterogeneous effects among groups of 
workers. Indeed, the associations between offshoring and labour market outcomes can hide 
important differences across individuals. For instance, workers performing highly non routine or 
interactive tasks – that is, tasks that are arguably difficult or more costly to offshore – are less 
likely to suffer the consequences of increased offshoring intensity. Numerous empirical studies 
indicate that in terms of objective job loss risk, high-skilled workers tend to be less affected by 
offshoring than low-skilled worker (Görg and Görlich, 2012, 2015). Moreover, the risk of job 
loss is higher for blue-collar workers (Lo Turco et al., 2013) and workers performing non-
routine and interactive tasks (Baumgarten, 2015). One of the objectives of this paper is to 
examine whether such discrepancies hold when we switch from objective job loss risks to 
perceived risks and job satisfaction. To that purpose, we report estimates for four categories of 
workers: high and low skill, white and blue-collar workers.  
There are several reasons to focus on Germany. First, it is one of the biggest markets within 
the EU. It is also more open to international trade than most other large developed Economies 
and registers highest level of exports worldwide (Bachmann and Braun, 2011). Second, as 
emphasised by Bachmann et al. (2014), the German labour markets is highly regulated with 
rigid wages, and shocks such as outsourcing might well be absorbed through employment rather 
than through wages, as confirmed by Görg and Görlich (2012). Third, international outsourcing 
has grown substantially in Germany over recent years. This makes its industry less exposed to 
external shocks on demand of final consumption goods and would explained why this country 
returned quite quickly to the level of employment prior to the Great Recession. In particular, 
German firms takes the opportunity brought about by the proximity of countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe, abundant in highly skilled workers but with lower wages (Baumgarten, 2015). 
The period we analysed is also marked by the increase of the participation in China in the trade 
of all developed countries, including Germany (Huber and Winkler, 2019).  Finally, the 
integration of Germany into GVC is salient. As pointed by OECD (2018) (p. 4), employment 
driven by foreign final demand increased between 2005 and 2015 in the majority of OECD 
countries but “Germany is the country among G20 for which a greater part of employment 
depends on foreign final demand”.  
_________________________ 
2 Lurweg (2010) also studies this issue but focus on the service sector. 
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The paper shows that offshoring is negatively associated with job satisfaction. This effect 
differs among categories of workers, with high skill white-collar workers being mostly 
unaffected by offshoring and low skill blue-collar workers suffering the largest negative effects. 
Discriminating between manufacturing and services activities, we find that the extent of 
heterogeneity and the offshoring effect is relatively larger in manufacturing industries. We also 
find that the effect of offshoring intensity upon job satisfaction is more negative and significant 
in periods of economic decline. The estimates suggest that offshoring is not significantly related 
with job insecurity, a result that applies to all workers’ categories. Still, increases in offshoring 
intensity can lead to significantly higher job risks during periods of economic decline.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical background. Section 3 
describes the dataset and variables used in the regressions. Section 4 presents the results. 
Section 5 includes a battery of sensitivity checks and complementary anslises. Section 6 
contains the concluding remarks. The paper includes an Appendix that describes the 
correspondence between NACE industry codes and TiVA industries.  
2 Background 
Theoretical predictions concerning the effects of offshoring on wages and employment are not 
as clear-cut as international trade theory predicted (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941). The effects 
of production fragmentation on employment are far from straightforward. The effects on wages 
have been more intensively studied so far. However, we can draw some lessons in terms of job 
satisfaction or job insecurities perception, as long as a foreseen decrease in wages could be 
assimilated with a risk of unemployment.  
The seminal reference in this literature is the theoretical model of Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008) that draws the attention to the fact that the fragmentation of production at the 
international level calls for a new approximation to trade and trade policies where trade does not 
consist in exchanging goods but exchanging tasks and value added. Thanks to advances in 
transportation and communications technology, it is increasingly viable to separate tasks in time 
and space. Certain type of tasks or labour can more easily be performed abroad. According to 
these authors, the decision to offshore poses a trade-off between the cost advantage of 
offshoring some tasks against the difficulties to supervise and coordinate the work. This is a 
reason why offshoring is not beneficial for all the tasks. Then, firms that can relate more 
intensively on offshorable tasks would expand and increase their demand for local workers who 
realise less offshorable tasks and whose productivity has increased.3 Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2006) approximate the offshorable category of works by least skilled blue-collars and 
conclude that productivity gains and improvement in the terms of trade allow compensating the 
falling demand for this category of labour, ending up with a moderated reduction of wages. 
Wright (2014) offers a more detailed empirical verification of the previous model using US 
_________________________ 
3 Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) complete their model to account for the recent debate about offshoring of 
high skilled tasks in particular in the service sector. They also conclude that the productivity gains would mitigate the 
reduction of wages of high skilled at home.  
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data. They approximate the nature of work by low- and high-skill wages. Their results support 
the prediction of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), especially regarding productivity gains. 
Studies exploring the determinants of changes in the nature of work in industrialized 
countries illustrate that there is a variety of forces at play in the economy, which alters the 
distribution of workplace tasks. There is a consensus in the literature (Hummels et al., 2018, for 
a survey) to consider, at least, two important distinct features of offshorable tasks, regardless 
skill requirements. First, routine tasks can be transmitted in a codified form and more easily 
transferred from one firm to another, or coordinated from abroad (Autor et al., 2013). Moreover, 
Blinder (2006) points out that tasks requiring more interaction are less easily offshorable. 
Ottaviano et al. (2013) underline that offshoring would in turn induce workers to perform more 
interactive tasks. 
2.1 Offshoring and wages 
Recent studies confirm the importance of the nature of tasks when accounting for the effects of 
offshoring on wages. Ebenstein et al. (2014) support the hypothesis that wage losses from 
offshoring are more pronounced for routine tasks. For the US, they show that globalization may 
affect wages by displacing workers from the manufacturing sector to other sectors in which they 
obtain less wages. Moreover, the negative wage effect of low-income-country offshoring is 
especially pronounced for the workers whose occupations have high routine-task indices. 
Hummels et al. (2014) draw similar conclusions in the Danish case. Conditional on education, 
workers suffer larger wage declines in response to offshoring if their occupations have high 
routineness.4  
The impact of offshoring on wages has been extensively studied in the case of Germany 
using different methodologies. Baumgarten et al. (2013) and Brändle and Koch (2015) have 
used the German Qualification and Career Survey to assign a task profile to the occupations 
listed in the survey they use (GSOEP and BIBB Survey, respectively). The German 
Qualifications and Career survey is a random sample of around one tenth of the German labour 
force, which contains detailed information on workplace and workers characteristics, including 
occupation and industry level variables.5 This information allows for the matching between 
occupations and task profiles Following this strategy, Brändle and Koch (2015) evidence that 
most manufacturing sectors, and many of the tasks performed in this area are both easily 
offshorable and outsourceable. Baumgarten et al. (2013) have linked the GSOEP to German 
Qualification and Career Survey to qualify properly tasks. Their findings support the hypothesis 
according to which offshoring would have less negative impact on wages of workers which 
_________________________ 
4 Other authors have studied similar questions for other countries, including Casabianca et al. (2019) for Peru; 
Consoli et al. (2016) for US; Parteka (2018) for Poland and Parteka and Wolszczak-Derlacz (2019) for a set of 
European countries and the United States. 
5 The task profile of German workplaces are classified according to objective and subjective information. Objective 
information includes the declaration of the main activity of the job and the use of workplace tools, while subjective 
questions refer to the worker’s assessment of the skills required to perform a job and the worker’s assessment of the 
job’s requirements such as the degree of repetitiveness, the relevance of deadlines, or the adaptation to new 
situations. 
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tasks require a higher degree of interactivity and are non-routine. Becker et al. (2013), using 
plant data, evidence that high offshoring is associated with large shares of non-routine-task 
workers and interactive-task workers at the headquarters. Görg and Görlich (2012) conclude 
that the nexus between export intensities of industries (or imports) and wages are weak, while 
trade would have more obvious effects on employment. Services offshoring would matter more 
than material offshoring for wages. Görg and Görlich (2015) re-examine similar questions 
focusing on the difference among temporary and permanent workers. In this more recent study, 
they account for offshoring at the industry level using data from the world input–output 
database (WIOD) where offshoring is measured by the share of imported value added in 
industry production. They conclude that the effects of offshoring on wages is similar for 
temporary and permanent. Taking a different perspective, Hogrefe and Yao (2016) compare 
transitory short-term fluctuations and permanent fluctuations of individuals’ income of German 
workers. They find that the latter would decrease with offshoring, and especially with 
offshoring to low-income destinations. 
2.2 Job insecurity  
The effect of offshoring on perceived job insecurity has been scarcely studied but we rely in this 
section on studies that investigate the effect of offshoring on observed turnovers, risk of losing 
jobs, switch to other sectors or to unemployment. In line with the findings of Grossman and 
Rossi-Hansberg (2008), offshoring may have contradictory effects on employment, which make 
rather unclear the overall expected effect and preview an increase in job insecurity. On the one 
hand, offshoring may induce a substitution of domestic workers by foreign suppliers provoking 
job losses. On the other hand, domestic firms may gain in market shares by increasing their 
productivity and thereby raise the demand for local workers.  
Crinó (2009) conduct an exhaustive survey of the empirical literature on this matter and 
concludes that relocation of production activities (material offshoring) seems to raise the 
volatility of employment, while service offshoring would have a lower impact on total 
employment but would favour high-skilled white-collar employees. She conjectures that these 
differences emerge from the still limited extension of service offshoring. Moreover, service 
offshoring also contributes to create new jobs in the domestic market. Evidence on services 
offshoring is still scarce to draw robust conclusions. An exception is Liu and Trefler (2019) who 
find that service offshoring to China and India has larger effects on switching down (switching 
to an occupation that pays less on average than the current occupation) than on switching up, in 
the US. Service offshoring would also have not affected so much the average wage of the 
workers from the service sector but would have raised unemployment rate of these white-
collars. 
With a similar setting, Görg and Görlich (2012) rely on objective unemployment hazards to 
study the different effect of trade exposure (measured using gross trade values) on the 
probability for workers to lose their jobs. They compare export intensive and non –export 
intensive sectors, and distinguish between service and material offshoring and between different 
categories of skilled workers. Their results tend to show that the effects of trade on 
unemployment probabilities (and on wages) are small, except for services industries where 
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export exposure is significantly correlated with high probability of becoming unemployed. Görg 
and Görlich (2015) underline that offshoring increases the unemployment risk of temporary 
low-skilled workers more than the one of permanent low-skilled workers. Moreover, offshoring 
may, through reallocation of activities lead to more employment opportunities for high-skilled 
workers.  
Bachmann and Braun (2011) use the IAB Employment Sample to explore the effect of trade 
on individual risk of losing a job in Germany. Both conclude that outsourcing would contribute 
to job stability in the service sector. The authors conclude that outsourcing has a positive but 
small impact on overall job stability in the manufacturing sector but would hurt more medium-
skilled and older workers. Baumgarten (2015) with the same dataset focuses on the difference 
between material and service offshoring. They confirm a small impact of both type of 
offshoring on job security, even if the risk is higher for workers performing non-routine and 
interactive tasks. 
Following similar strategies, other authors have focused on other countries. Pfaffermayr et 
al. (2007) find that outsourcing increases the labour turnover in Austria. For Italy, Lo Turco et 
al. (2013) conclude that material offshoring to low income countries would hurt especially blue 
collars by raising their probability to exit the manufacturing sectors. White collars would be 
more affected by offshoring to high-income countries that would increase the likelihood of 
switching to another job within the manufacturing sector.  
Only a few studies have investigated the nexus between trade and a subjective measure of 
job insecurity as we do. Lurweg (2010) focuses on the job insecurity of workers in German 
service industries using both a “subjective” and a more “objective” measure. Employees from 
sectors producing a traded service, or a service which exports are growing, are objectively more 
exposed to unemployment, and their feelings accurately reflect the situation. Thus, this study 
does not account for manufacturing industries, the ones that are more affected by offshoring. 
Geishecker et al (2012) use data from Germany covering the 1995–2006 period to examine the 
relation between offshoring and job loss fears. Using linear fixed effects estimates, they find 
that offshoring to low-wage countries significantly raises job loss fears whilst offshoring to 
high-wage countries somewhat lowers them. Moreover, their results indicate that high-skilled 
workers are more sensitive to offshoring. Finally, Savsin and Akay (2020) study the impact of 
offshoring on mental well-being of German, British and Australian workers over the period 
2000 to 2013.  They find that offshoring negatively affects workers’ mental well-being more 
than objective and subjective job security do, and the effect is larger in business services and 
among high-skilled workers. 
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3 Empirical strategy 
3.1 Data set and variables 
The analysis is based on individual level data from the 2000–2013 waves of the German Social 
Economic Panel (SOEP). Initiated in 1984, the German GSOEP is a representative longitudinal 
annual household survey that contains information on a large set of personal and household 
characteristics.6 It also includes the industry in which an individual works. The sample includes 
full-time employees of prime age (i.e., aged 18–64) who are employed in manufacturing (NACE 
15–36) or services industries (NACE 40–74). We remove the self-employed and those currently 
employed in (occupational) education or retraining. The various reduction steps result in an 
unbalanced panel of 69,733 observations from 17,888 respondents. 
Job satisfaction is measured with a question in which respondents are asked “How satisfied 
are you with your job (if employed)?” on a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 is “completely dissatisfied” 
and 10 is “completely satisfied”. Hereafter, the answer to this will be referred to as Job 
Satisfaction (JS). Despite a long tradition among sociologists and psychologists, subjective data 
was subject to criticisms among some economists concerned about the potential biases arising 
from cultural differences, framing problems, cognitive bias, and mood effects. Although for 
reasons of space we do not enter into details, we note that the evidence accumulated over recent 
years has proven the validity and consistency of self-reported data. In a nutshell, self-reported 
measures of job satisfaction have shown predictive power over relevant actions such as job 
absence, dismissals, job quits and productivity. 
Perceived Job Insecurity (JI) is captured by “How concerned are you about the following 
issues: Your job security (if you are employed)?” Respondents can either answer “very 
concerned”, “somewhat concerned”, or “not concerned at all”. We consider respondents to 
perceive their job as insecure if they check “very concerned” or “somewhat concerned”, 
whereas respondents perceive their jobs as secure if they responded “not at all concerned”. 
Therefore, our measure of job insecurity is a binary variable.  
As for the measurement of offshoring, there is consensus that exports and imports have 
become a poor indicator of openness. Due to the increasing importance of international trade of 
intermediate products, gross values of exports does not reflect accurately the domestic value 
added embodied in goods and services while imports may include not only foreign value added 
but also domestic value added incorporated in previous stage of the production of these 
imported goods. To avoid the double account of foreign value added embodied in exports and in 
imports, it is necessary disentangle the content of domestic and foreign value added in gross 
exports and, additionally to take into account the domestic content incorporated in imported 
inputs used in exported production.  
Several methodological proposals have emerged in recent years, including Koopman et al. 
(2010, 2014), Daudin et al. (2011), Johnson and Noguera (2012), Timmer (2012) and Timmer et 
_________________________ 
6 Every year, there are nearly 11,000 households and more than 20,000 persons sampled. The data provide 
information on all household members, consisting of Germans living in the Old and New German States, foreigners, 
and recent immigrants to Germany. For detailed information see Wagner at al. (2007). In this paper we use the 
GSOEP files corresponding to the soep.v30 version, and rely on the yearly $PEQUIV, $PGEN and $HGEN files of 
the data set. 
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al. (2014). With some nuances, all the calculations proposed are based on tables input-output at 
the world level that provide intensity in the use of intermediate goods by sectors and partner 
countries. They end up with the Foreign Value Added (FVA) in country gross exports and the 
Domestic Value Added (DVA) in imports. FVA and DVA can be expressed either in function of 
total gross exports or imports or in terms of industry production, depending on the purpose of 
the study. There are two main sources providing such data for large sample of countries: world 
input–output database (WIOD) from the World Bank and the Trade in Value Added (TiVA) 
database from the OCDE. The period covered by the second one is longer and offers the 
advantage of directly provide the main indicators already calculated. To proxy the intensity of 
offshoring, we use in a first step, the indicator Foreign Value Added in country gross exports 
(FVAX) expressed as a share of total gross exports (EXP) from the 2016 version of TiVA 
(2000–2011) and extrapolate using the 2018 version of TiVA for the years 2012–2013. A higher 
value of the indicator expresses a higher intensity of offshoring.  
TiVA data are provided at a quite broad aggregated level. The categories are shown in the 
Appendix. These include several sectors of the two-digit ISIC rev 4 nomenclature. We match 
this classification with the 2-digit NACE industry codes included in the GSOEP and, therefore, 
pair individual information in the GSOEP sample with industry offshoring levels. As a 
limitation, TiVA categories are more aggregated than NACE codes. Hence, some industries 
from the GSOEP classification have been assigned the same offshoring intensity. For almost all 
industries the matching between TiVA and NACE is univocal except for 2 categories, which 
belong to several TiVA sectors. In these cases, we aggregate the FVAX of these TiVA 
industries, and we calculate the share in overall exports of this broad category. Overall, the 59 
NACE industries of the GSOEP have been assigned 36 offshoring intensities (see appendix). 
Specifically, the 23 manufactures’ industries that have been matched with 18 TiVA categories, 
the 28 services’ industries has been matched with 17 TiVA industries and, finally, the 8 
industries of the primary sector (NACE 1 to 14) correspond to 4 TiVA categories. In the 
Appendix we include a table with the correspondence between TiVA and NACE industries. 
To test how offshoring affects job satisfaction and job security of workers performing 
different tasks, we group the 2-digit level codes from the International Standard Classification 
of Occupations (ISCO) provided in the GSOEP into four different task categories following 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) among others. This classification could be improved in 
the future following the approach of Baumgarten et al. (2013). Therefore, we differentiate 
among four task categories: i) high skilled white collar; ii) low skilled white collar; iii) high 
skilled blue collar and iv) low skilled blue collar.7 We hypothesise low skilled blue collars to 
realise more routine and offshorable and as a consequence to be more affected by offshoring. 
_________________________ 
7 Each category corresponds to specific ISCO 88 occupation codes: i) high skilled white collar (legislators, senior 
officials and managers, professionals and technicians and associate professionals); ii) low skilled white collar (clerks 
and service workers and shop and market sales workers); iii) high skilled blue collar (skilled agricultural and fishery 
workers and craft and related trades workers) and iv) low skilled blue collar (plant and machine operators and 
assemblers and elementary occupations). Armed forces are excluded.   
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3.2 Specification and research hypotheses 
Job satisfaction is assumed to be a function of individual and job characteristics,  
𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓�𝑌∗(𝑋𝑖𝑖 ,𝑂𝑖𝑖−1, 𝜀𝑖𝑖  )�                                               (1) 
where 𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖  denotes job satisfaction of individual i at time t. Vector X includes monthly labour 
income in gross terms, i.e., before taxes and social security contributions are deducted and, to 
account for inflation, transformed into real terms buy using the yearly consumer price included 
in the GSOEP. X also included age and age squared, job tenure, hours of work years of 
schooling and number of children and adults at home. All the variables are in logs. The model 
also includes health status, marital status, a full vector of industry dummy variables, controls for 
the type of task performed by the individual, dummies for the 16 German federal states and year 
fixed effects. 𝑂𝑖𝑖−1 is the offshoring intensity of the industry in which individual i worked in t-
1, and  𝜀𝑖𝑖  is an independent error term. We proceed likewise to define the equation for job 
insecurity,  
𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓�𝑌∗(𝑋𝑖𝑖 ,𝑂𝑖𝑖−1, 𝜀𝑖𝑖  )�                                               (2) 
We must note that we use offshoring intensity at time t–1 to explain job satisfaction and job 
insecurity at time t. Since the offshoring variable pre-dates the dependent variable, we are 
factoring out from the estimates any spurious correlation that may run from contemporaneous 
job satisfaction and insecurity to offshoring intensity. Another potential concern with the 
direction of causality is the possibility that offshoring is correlated with industry-specific non-
observables. Lower JS in industries with more offshoring intensity may suggest a true effect but, 
also, that these industries have other characteristics that affect negatively JS. This could be the 
case if, for example, workers in industries exposed to more import competition have worse 
working conditions (less hours flexibility, higher turnovers, etc). A same reasoning applies to JI. 
We address this concern by, firstly, including the full vector of industry dummies, so that any 
characteristic of the industry that may affect both offshoring and job satisfaction and/or job 
insecurity are controlled for in our estimations. In addition, we allow for full sets of industry-
year fixed effects, which flexibly absorb any other time-varying determinant of job satisfaction 
and job insecurity operating at the sector level.  
As a second concern, working in specific industries could reflect individual unobserved 
characteristics: for example, individuals who self-select in “Arts, entertainment, recreation and 
other service activities” may have specific personality traits that are correlated with the 
perception of their jobs and the satisfaction derived from them. Therefore, we estimate the 
equations allowing for individual fixed effects. Fixed effects remove time-invariant 
determinants of job satisfaction and job insecurity at the individual level (e.g., differences in 
personality, attitudes towards risk, etc) and imply that we exploit within-person variation over 
time for model identification.  
We take reported JS to be cardinal. This is, we assume that the distance between the eleven 
satisfaction categories carry a meaning. It has been shown that assuming cardinality as oppose 
to regress satisfaction with ordinal models is rather irrelevant for the results in terms of trade-
offs between explanatory variables (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004), while it has the 
advantage of yielding coefficients that can be directly interpreted as marginal effects. In the JS 
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equation we rely on the Probit Adapted Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) as developed by Van 
Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008, p. 29–34). As a robustness check, we have estimated the 
model with the standard linear model and found very small differences in terms of trade-offs 
between variables and statistical significance.  
Implementing POLS begins by deriving �μj�j=0
J  values of a standard normal associated with 
the cumulative frequencies of the J different categories of the dependent variable, with μ0 =
−∞,  μJ = ∞. Then the expectation of a standard normally distributed variable is taken for an 
interval between any two adjacent values. Thus, if the true unobserved continuous variable for 
individual i at time t is 𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖∗ , where the observed is 𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖 = j  if μj−1 < 𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖∗ ≤ μj , j = 1, … . , J, 
then the conditional expectation of the latent variable is given by: 
𝐽?̈?𝑖𝑖 = E�𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖∗ |μj−1 < 𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖∗ < μj � =
n�μj−1� − n�μj �
N�μj� − N�μj−1�
                                    (3) 
where n is the normal density and N is the cumulative normal distribution. 𝐽?̈?𝑖𝑖 is normalized so 
that it has a zero mean and a standard deviation of one. The approach allows the application of a 
linear estimator on the conditional expectations: 
JS̈it = αXit  + βOit−1+υi + ηit                                                                            (4)   
where 𝜂𝑖𝑖 an independent error term for individual 𝑖 at time 𝑡 and 𝜐𝑖 is an individual effect 
that varies across individuals and is constant over time. We hypothesize that the effect that 
offshoring intensity has on JS depends on the type of task performed by the individual. Thus we 
define a dummy variable 𝑇𝑖𝑖
𝑗  that takes value 1 if the individual’s task corresponds to category j, 
j = 1, 2, 3, 4, and include an interaction term between O and the corresponding task category. 
We leave j =1 (high skilled white collar worker) as the reference category and therefore do not 
include the interaction term in this case,   
JS̈it = αXit  + βOit−1+ γTit
j × Oit−1 + υi + ηit                                                (5) 
A well-determined coefficient on the type of task-offshoring interaction term 𝛾 would imply 
that the effects of offshoring differ between individuals performing different tasks.  
As for our binary dependent variable, job insecurity, it may be modelled as a function of a 
latent variable JI* that is not measured, is continuous, has a threshold point that determines the 
observed value of JI, and is a function of observable characteristics  
 JIit∗ = αXit  + βOit−1+ γTit
j × Oit−1 + υi + ηit                                                 (6) 
with 
 𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖 = 1   if      𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖∗ > 0  
     JIit = 0    if     JIit∗ ≤ 0                                                        (7) 
For simplicity, we will ignore the binary dependent nature of the dependent variable and 
replace 𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖∗  with  𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖  in Eq. (6). The advantage of using the linear estimator is that the 
coefficients can be directly interpreted as marginal effects and these are very similar to those 
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obtained using non-linear methods. The results from a probit model are available from the 
authors upon request.  
4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive analysis 
In Table 1, we report summary statistics. Average JS is 7.0 whereas 14.5% of the workers report 
to be insecure at their jobs. These figures indicate that, in general, individuals are fairly satisfied 
and feel secure about conserving their jobs. Average gross labour income amounts to €2,540.7 
and 11.9% of the sample has a temporary contract. Foreign value added represents on average 
22.4 % of gross exports with a sizable dispersion among industries, ranging from a minimum of 
2.6% (“Real state, property activities”) to a maximum of 46.0% (“Manufacturing of basic 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
Note: Source: GSOEP 2000–2013 waves 
Average std Min Max
Job satisfaction 7.012 1.990 0 10
Job insecurity 0.145 0.352 0 1
Income 2540.730 1810.264 0 40000
Offshoring 14.374 7.897 2.6 46.03
High skilled white collar 0.484 0.500 0 1
Low skilled white collar 0.227 0.419 0 1
High skilled blue collar 0.153 0.360 0 1
Low skilled blue collar 0.136 0.343 0 1
Temporary contract 0.119 0.323 0 1
Woman 0.477 0.489 0 1
Age 42.154 11.183 18 65
Tenure 11.515 10.129 0 52
Working hours 39.410 10.910 10 99
Years of schooling 12.343 2.579 7 18
Numer of adults 2.261 0.866 1 10
Number of children 0.625 0.914 0 9
Married 0.644 0.479 0 1
Single 0.260 0.438 0 1
Divorced 0.083 0.276 0 1
Widowed 0.014 0.115 0 1
Badhealth 0.102 0.303 0 1
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metals”).  Women account for 47.7% of the sample.  Average age and tenure amount to 42.2 
and 11.5 years, respectively. On average, individuals in the sample work 39.4 hours per 
week,have completed 12.6 years of schooling, live in a household with 2.3 adults and 0.6 
children. Most individuals in the sample are married (64.4%) and 10% report a bad health 
status. 
4.2 Offshoring and job satisfaction  
In Table 2, we report the estimates of the determinants of JS. All the effects reported in Table 2 
are expressed as standard deviations of JS. Model 1a constitutes a parsimonious specification, 
controlling only for individual and year fixed effects. Before focusing on the effects of 
offshoring, we first describe the results for the remaining covariates. The results do not present 
surprises for the connoisseur of the literature. Job satisfaction depends positively on labour 
income and negatively on age, tenure and hours of work. Years of schooling are negatively 
related to JS, a result that can be explained by the negative effects that overeducation exerts 
upon satisfaction at the job, a phenomenon that is more prevalent among the educated. We do 
not detect significant differences due to contract duration. Moreover, singles and individuals 
living in households with more adults report lower JS, while having a bad health status emerges 
as a salient determinant of job dissatisfaction.  
Turning to the crux of our analysis, we find that offshoring intensity is negatively related 
with JS. The coefficient is significant at the 5% level and suggests that a 0.01 increase in 
logarithmic offshoring intensity (an approximately 1% increase of the index) is associated with 
a loss of 0.00033 standard deviations of JS. The figure may seem negligible but it should not be 
so if we compare it with the relative effects of other covariates. Satisfaction equations can be 
used to assess the importance of a given dimension relative to other dimensions, and to 
construct equivalence scales between relevant variables (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2013). For instance, 
we may take labour income as a reference, since it is one of the most relevant determinants of 
JS. An 0.01 increase in logarithmic labour income (an approximately 1% increase in labour 
income) is associated with an increase of 0.00131 standard deviations of JS. Therefore, using 
the coefficient of labour income as a reference we can calculate the trade-off between labour 
income and offshoring that maintains JS constant. The reference individual would need a 
compensation of about 0.252% of her labour income to experience a 1% increase in offshoring 
intensity ([exp(0.033/ 0.131 x 0.01)–1]x100 = 0.252). Similarly, other things equal, a 1% 
increase in offshoring intensity would be equivalent to an increase in hours worked of 1.80% 
([exp(0.033/0.056 x 0.01)–1]x100 = 1.8).  
In Model 1b we include a full vector of industry dummies and industry-year fixed effects. In 
this case, the estimate of the offshoring fails to be statistically significant. This result suggests 
the existence of industry characteristics that may affect both offshoring and job satisfaction. 
There might be time-varying determinants of offshoring and job satisfaction operating at the 
sector level.  
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Table 2. Job Satisfaction and offshoring  
 
Notes: i) Source: GSOEP 2000–2013 waves; ii) *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** denotes significant at the 5% 
level; * denotes significant at the 10% level; iii) The reference individual has a permanent contract, is married, is a 
high skill white collar worker, has a good health status, average income, age, tenure, hours of work, years of 
schooling, number of adults and children at home and is exposed to average offshoring levels.  
However, once we allow for interactions between offshoring and worker’s category we 
obtain, again, significant effects of offshoring even after controlling for industry (Models 2a and 
2b). The models unveil substantial heterogeneity surrounding the offshoring effect. Specifically, 
we find that the reference individual (a high skilled white-collar worker) is not affected by 
offshoring intensity. In contrast, workers in the remaining three categories are worse off if they 
work in industries with higher offshoring intensity. The estimates in Model 2b indicate that a 
1% increase of offshoring intensity would need a compensation of 0.160%, 0.275% and 0.321% 
of labour income depending on whether the individuals is a low skilled white collar, high skilled 
blue collar or low skilled blue collar worker, respectively. Overall, these results tend to show 
that the estimates obtained in Models 1a and 1b regarding the offshoring effect represent an 
average across workers from different categories. Once we allow for a differentiated effect, the 
model is indicative of sensitive differences across groups of workers. The fact that low skilled 
workers are more sensitive to variations in offshoring would be consistent with the notion that 
trade accelerates skill biased technological changes through a diffusion of technologies world-
wide. 
coefficient t coefficient t coefficient t coefficient t
Ln(Income) 0.131 *** 9.72 0.133 *** 9.82 0.129 *** 9.58 0.131 *** 9.68
Offshoring -0.033 ** -2.38 -0.036 -1.22 -0.011 -0.77 -0.018 -0.61
Offshoring × low skilled white collar -0.024 *** -3.56 -0.021 *** -3.19
Offshoring × high skilled blue collar -0.032 *** -3.75 -0.036 *** -4.13
Offshoring × low skilled blue collar -0.040 *** -4.57 -0.042 *** -4.79
Temporary 0.001 0.05 -0.006 -0.38 0.001 0.04 -0.006 -0.39
Ln(age) -5.474 *** -2.98 -5.531 *** -3.01 -5.315 *** -2.89 -5.383 *** -2.93
Ln(age)2 0.977 *** 2.78 0.985 *** 2.82 0.946 *** 2.69 0.955 *** 2.72
Ln(tenure) -0.157 *** -24.9 -0.155 *** -24.6 -0.157 *** -24.9 -0.155 *** -24.6
Ln(working hours) -0.056 *** -2.62 -0.056 *** -2.63 -0.057 *** -2.69 -0.057 *** -2.71
Ln(years of schooling) -0.626 *** -4.41 -0.658 *** -4.62 -0.653 *** -4.58 -0.685 *** -4.81
Ln(adults) 0.003 0.12 0.003 0.12 0.003 0.14 0.003 0.14
Ln(children) 0.032 2.32 0.032 ** 2.31 0.031 ** 2.25 0.031 ** 2.23
Single -0.044 ** -2.01 -0.044 ** -2.01 -0.044 ** -1.98 -0.044 ** -1.97
Divorced -0.072 *** -3.02 -0.071 *** -2.98 -0.071 *** -3.01 -0.070 *** -2.97
Widowed -0.017 -0.27 -0.021 -0.33 -0.015 -0.23 -0.018 -0.31
Bad health -0.298 *** -22.3 -0.298 *** -22.2 -0.298 *** -22.2 -0.297 *** -22.2
Fixed effect industry no yes no yes
Fixed effect year yes yes yes yes
Fixed effect state yes yes yes yes
R2 - within 0.040 0.041 0.041 0.042
No. of obs 69,733 69,733 69,733 69,733
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b 
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4.3 Offshoring and job insecurity 
In Table 3, we focus on the determinants of JI. According to the results, JI depends crucially on 
contract duration, with workers having temporary contract being more than 12 percentage points 
more likely to feel insecure at their jobs. JI also depends positively on tenure and bad health. A 
perhaps surprising result is that workers with more education are more likely to report 
insecurity. However, we must recall that the results are controlling for individual fixed effects 
and, therefore, they are based on within individual variation of schooling, a variable that shows 
very little yearly variation among adult workers. Only 2.5% of the sample workers register an 
interannual variation in years of schooling, and most of them (43%) are aged below 35. It is 
likely that a small group of young workers with low professional experience and tenure who 
have recently accessed the labour market drives the positive effect of schooling on JI.   
The offshoring coefficient is significant in Model 1a, suggesting that JI rises with offshoring 
intensity, but turns to non-significant once we add the industry controls in Model 1b. This result 
suggests that offshoring tends to be higher in industries with higher job insecurity.8 There are 
 
Table 3. Job insecurity and offshoring  
 
Notes: i) Source: GSOEP 2000–2013 waves; ii) *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** denotes significant at the 5% 
level; * denotes significant at the 10% level; iii) The reference individual has a permanent contract, is married, is a 
high skill white collar worker, has a good health status, average income, age, tenure, hours of work, years of 
schooling, number of adults and children at home and is exposed to average offshoring levels.  
_________________________ 
8 This is confirmed by the raw data. When going from the bottom 25% to the top 25% of the offshoring intensity 
distribution, the proportion of insecure workers goes from 11.3% to 16.8%. 
coefficient t coefficient t coefficient t coefficient t
Ln(Income) 0.005 0.00 0.004 0.86 0.005 0.95 0.004 0.84
Offshoring 0.015 *** 2.79 -0.002 -0.19 0.014 *** 2.65 -0.002 -0.16
Offshoring × low skilled white collar -0.001 -0.56 -0.002 -0.61
Offshoring × high skilled blue collar 0.001 0.26 0.001 0.31
Offshoring × low skilled blue collar 0.000 0.08 0.000 0.01
Temporary 0.122 *** 21.02 0.123 ** 21.06 0.122 *** 21.01 0.123 *** 21.1
Ln(age) 0.364 0.53 0.346 0.51 0.371 0.54 0.355 0.52
Ln(age)2 -0.058 -0.44 -0.055 -0.42 -0.059 -0.45 -0.056 -0.43
Ln(tenure) 0.017 *** 7.31 0.017 ** 7.31 0.017 *** 7.28 0.017 *** 7.28
Ln(working hours) 0.005 0.67 0.006 0.75 0.005 0.66 0.006 0.73
Ln(years of schooling) 0.222 *** 4.11 0.225 ** 4.16 0.221 *** 4.11 0.224 *** 4.15
Ln(adults) 0.015 * 1.74 0.015 * 1.76 0.015 * 1.74 0.015 * 1.76
Ln(children) -0.009 * -1.72 -0.009 * -1.67 -0.009 * -1.72 -0.009 * -1.67
Single -0.008 -0.92 -0.008 -0.96 -0.008 -0.92 -0.008 -0.96
Divorced 0.006 0.65 0.005 0.61 0.006 0.65 0.005 0.61
Widowed -0.039 * -1.66 -0.039 * -1.65 -0.039 * -1.67 -0.039 * -1.66
Bad health 0.028 *** 5.51 0.028 ** 5.51 0.028 *** 5.51 0.028 *** 5.51
Fixed effect industry no yes no yes
Fixed effect year yes yes yes yes
Fixed effect state yes yes yes yes
R2 - within 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.026
No. of obs 69,733 69,733 69,733 69,733
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b 
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several explanations that may account for the non-significant relation between JI and offshoring. 
Firstly, it may be the case that adjustments following macroeconomic and offshoring shocks 
lead to fewer hirings but not to job separations, especially in a country with strict dismissal 
protection regulations like Germany. For instance, using German data Baumgarten (2015) finds 
that offshoring is not, on average, associated with significantly higher transition rates from 
employment to non-employment. Also based on German data and objective employment 
transitions, Bachmann and Braun (2011) find only a modest relationship between offshoring and 
employment transitions, although in their case the coefficient is statistically significant in some 
specifications. Using subjective appraisals of job insecurity and GSOEP data, Savsin and Akay 
(2020) find that offshoring is not statistically significant on perceptions of job security. 
Moreover, they test the robustness of their result by controlling for potential confounding 
macroeconomic factors related to technological development, labour market wages, 
employment and productivity. The underlying assumption is that these “globalization” measures 
might confound the relationship between offshoring, well-being and job insecurity if they 
correlate with offshoring within each industry. However, they find that the magnitude and 
significance of the baseline model is hardly affected by inclusion of these variables, thus 
supporting the notion that well-being and JI are depend importantly on the industry’s 
idiosyncratic factors.  
Secondly, workers performing offshorable tasks may suffer from wage cuts instead of job 
separations. If most of the adjustment occurs though wages, workers may not perceive increased 
offshoring as a signal of increased job risk.9 Thirdly, there might be industry characteristics that 
are simultaneously correlated with offshoring and JI. The industry dummies included in the 
specifications can potentially soak up the effect of the offshoring variable if changes in 
offshoring intensity are correlated with industry-level factors that have a direct impact on 
perceived JI, such as average turnover and dismissal rates, union density and hiring conditions.  
In Models 2a and 2b, we allow for a differential effect of offshoring across categories of 
workers. The interaction terms fail to be statistically significant, thus suggesting that as far as JI 
is concerned, offshoring intensity at the industry level would affect in the same manner all the 
categories of workers (high skilled white collar, low skilled white collar, high skilled blue collar 
and low skilled blue collar). However, since on average offshoring has no significant effect on 
JI, we consider that JI is more related with characteristics of the industries. For instance, 
Geishecker (2008) reports that the effect of offshoring on employment transitions depends on 
the duration of the employment spell but not on the worker skill group. Moreover, the results in 
Görg and Görlich (2015) suggest that the link between offshoring and unemployment may differ 
and even revert sign across industries. For instance, they find that services offshoring to may 
lead to productivity improvements which imply higher job security, while materials offshoring 
is largely innocuous in terms of job risk. Therefore, to the extent that the various skills groups of 
workers are distributed among all industries, estimates that average across industries may fail to 
be statistically significant. 
_________________________ 
9 To shed light on this issue, we estimated a set of wage regressions including the same explanatory variables as in 
the benchmark model, the underlying hypothesis being that offshoring intensity negatively affects wages. We found a 
negative relationship, with the wage effects of a 1% increase in offshoring intensity ranging from -0.28% to -0.34%. 
However, in all cases the coefficient failed to be significant at conventional levels. 
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5 Discussion and sensitivity checks 
The results show that the effects of offshoring on JS differ across workers from different 
categories. High skill white-collar workers are mostly unaffected by offshoring, while the 
remaining categories are significantly worse off, the higher the offshoring intensity in their 
industry is. On the opposite, JI is not affected by the offshoring intensity, a result that holds 
among all workers’ categories.  
In this section, we test the robustness of these results. To that purpose, we perform a set of 
sensitivity checks. First, we start by noting that the results presented so far include sectors that 
are intensive in natural resources. This is the case of agriculture, hunting, forestry, mining and 
extraction (NACE codes from 1 to 14). Although only 1.05% of the sample workers are 
employed in these sectors, it might be the case that the inclusion of these activities distorts to 
some extent the relation between offshoring, JS and JI. This is so because imports in sectors that 
are intensive in natural resources may not reflect the displacement or substitution of national 
production by international competitors, but mirrors the fact that the country does not possess 
the natural resources required in the production process. If this is the case, the offshoring index 
used in the regressions would not capture intentional import competition but a mere need of 
intermediate inputs. Then, these sectors intensive in natural resources are mainly traded on an 
inter-industry basis with no possibility of offshoring. In Table 4, we re-estimate the Models 2a 
and 2b after dropping individuals employed in natural resources intensive methods. For space 
reasons, we report only the income and offshoring coefficients. Again, we find that the 
offshoring effect on JS differs among workers with different categories, the more negative effect 
corresponding to low skilled blue-collar workers. We find that the estimates remain practically 
unaltered relative to the previous estimates. The same applies to the JI equations. Offshoring 
intensity affects positively the probability of feeling insecure at the job (Model 2a). However, 
this effect is mostly driven by non-observable conditioners at the industry level. Once we 
introduce controls for activity sector (Model 2b), the coefficient becomes non-significant.  
Second, we calculate separate regressions for workers employed in the manufacturing (NACE 
15–36) and services (NACE 40–74) activities. Indeed, manufacturing includes activities more 
prone to the fragmentation of production since products include a large variety of parts and 
components. In contrast, services include many non-tradable activities even if offshoring of 
some services has been facilitated by ICT in recent years. The results, reported in Tables 5 and 
6, show that offshoring intensity is negatively related with JS, both in manufacturing and 
services industries. Within each sector we detect, in line with the general result, substantial 
heterogeneity of workers’ sensitivity to offshoring, with those in inferior task categories being 
more affected by offshoring. Still, the negative effect of offshoring upon JS is higher in 
manufacturing than in service activities once we control for industry fixed-effects. In this case 
(Model 2b) the level effect of offshoring or, in other words, the effect of offshoring for the 
reference individual (a high skilled white-collar worker) is negative, high and significant, 
suggesting that all workers in manufacturing activities are affected by offshoring regardless of 
their task category. In terms of JI, the results confirm previous findings and no remarkable 
differences emerge. Once we include the industry dummies and industry-year fixed effects, the 
estimates of the offshoring effect fail to be statistically significant and we detect no difference 
between tasks. 
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Table 4. Job satisfaction, job insecurity and offshoring – Excluding NACE 1–14 industries 
 
Notes: i) Source: GSOEP 2000–2013 waves; ii) *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** denotes significant at the 5% 
level; * denotes significant at the 10% level; iii) The results are controlling for contract duration, age, tenure, working 
hours, schooling, number of adults and children, marital and health status; iv) The reference individual has a 
permanent contract, is married, is a high skill white collar worker, has a good health status, average income, age, 
tenure, hours of work, years of schooling, number of adults and children at home and is exposed to average 
offshoring levels.  
Table 5. Job satisfaction and offshoring, by activity 
 
Notes: i) Source: GSOEP 2000–2013 waves; ii) *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** denotes significant at the 5% 
level; * denotes significant at the 10% level; iii) The results are controlling for contract duration, age, tenure, working 
hours, schooling, number of adults and children, marital and health status; iv) The reference individual has a 
permanent contract, is married, is a high skill white collar worker, has a good health status, average income, age, 
tenure, hours of work, years of schooling, number of adults and children at home and is exposed to average 
offshoring levels.  
coefficient t coefficient t coefficient t coefficient t
Ln(Income) 0.127 *** 9.36 0.127 *** 9.35 0.004 0.77 0.004 0.72
Offshoring -0.021 -1.43 -0.030 -1.00 0.017 *** 3.00 0.000 0.02
Offshoring × low skilled white collar -0.025 *** -3.67 -0.023 *** -3.36 -0.001 -0.59 -0.001 -0.59
Offshoring × high skilled blue collar -0.028 *** -3.22 -0.031 *** -3.50 0.001 0.44 0.001 0.41
Offshoring × low skilled blue collar -0.038 *** -4.36 -0.041 *** -4.59 0.000 0.05 0.000 0.00
Fixed effect industry no yes no yes
Fixed effect year yes yes yes yes
Fixed effect state yes yes yes yes
R2 - within 0.041 0.042 0.025 0.026
No. of obs 69,011 69,011 69,011 69,011
Job insecurity
Model 2a Model 2aModel 2b 
Job satisfaction
Model 2b 
coefficient t coefficient t coefficient t coefficient t
Ln(Income) 0.058 ** 1.82 0.059 ** 1.85 0.136 *** 6.15 0.135 *** 6.10
Offshoring -0.131 -1.03 -0.160 ** -2.02 0.019 0.54 -0.012 -1.08
Offshoring × low skilled white collar -0.009 -0.69 -0.022 *** -3.23 -0.024 ** -2.32 -0.024 ** -2.26
Offshoring × high skilled blue collar -0.012 -0.98 -0.033 *** -3.67 -0.037 ** -2.03 -0.041 ** -2.21
Offshoring × low skilled blue collar -0.025 ** -1.98 -0.042 *** -4.66 -0.049 *** -2.88 -0.052 *** -2.99
Fixed effect industry no yes no yes
Fixed effect year yes yes yes yes
Fixed effect state yes yes yes yes
R2 - within 0.049 0.049 0.036 0.036
No. of obs 26,917 26,917 42,816 42,816
Manufacturing Services
Model 2a Model 2b Model 2a Model 2b 
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Table 6. Job insecurity and offshoring, by activity 
 
Notes: i) Source: GSOEP 2000–2013 waves; ii) *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** denotes significant at the 5% 
level; * denotes significant at the 10% level; iii) The results are controlling for contract duration, age, tenure, working 
hours, schooling, number of adults and children, marital and health status; iv) The reference individual has a 
permanent contract, is married, is a high skill white collar worker, has a good health status, average income, age, 
tenure, hours of work, years of schooling, number of adults and children at home and is exposed to average 
offshoring levels.  
Third, we inspect the relation between offshoring, workers’ categories and temporary 
contracts. There are reasons to believe that workers with fixed-term contracts are affected 
differently by offshoring than workers with permanent contracts. Temporary workers are 
frequently used as a channel to buffer negative economic shocks. They are more prone to see 
their labour market position worsen following a shock, and they have a weaker bargaining 
position than permanent workers do. Hence, they might face stronger JS and JI variations in 
case employers adjust to globalization pressure. To explore this issue, we expand our 
specification to allow for interactions between offshoring, temporary contracts and workers’ 
categories. This specification allows us not only to test whether offshoring affects differently 
workers with a temporary contract, but also to examine to what extent the differences across 
workers’ categories reported in the paper can be due to the unequal prevalence of temporary 
contracts among the different categories. Results displayed in Table 7 reject this hypothesis. We 
do not find significant differences among temporary and permanent workers regarding the 
offshoring effect. This result applies to the four categories of workers considered in the analysis, 
and for the two dependent variables considered in the regressions. The only significant effect 
corresponds to the differential effect of offshoring among low skill blue-collar workers with a 
temporary contract when accounting for job insecurity. In this group, the effects of offshoring 
are negative, although the coefficient is significant only at the 10% level.  
Fourth, offshoring intensity is not constant over time and may be subject to macroeconomic 
shocks. Moreover, the effects of offshoring intensity upon workers’ life and job conditions may 
differ over the economic cycle.10 If increases in globalization pressure worsen worker’s 
employment opportunities, bargaining power and turnover rates, it is likely that these effects are  
 
_________________________ 
10 We thank an anonymous referee for this valuable insight. 
JI
coefficient t coefficient t coefficient t coefficient t
Ln(Income) -0.013 -0.96 -0.013 -0.98 -0.007 -0.86 -0.007 -0.86
Offshoring 0.044 1.39 0.046 1.38 0.022 1.59 0.008 0.39
Offshoring × low skilled white collar -0.003 -0.50 -0.003 -0.51 -0.002 -0.60 -0.002 -0.57
Offshoring × high skilled blue collar -0.004 -0.77 -0.004 -0.79 0.001 0.20 0.001 0.09
Offshoring × low skilled blue collar -0.001 -0.27 -0.001 -0.26 -0.002 -0.30 -0.002 -0.25p y
Fixed effect industry no yes no yes
Fixed effect year yes yes yes yes
Fixed effect state yes yes yes yes
R2 - within 0.048 0.048 0.024 0.024
No. of obs 26,917 26,917 42,816 42,816
Manufacturing Services
Model 2a Model 2b Model 2a Model 2b 
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Table 7. Job satisfaction, job insecurity, offshoring and temporary contracts 
 
Notes: i) Source: GSOEP 2000–2013 waves; ii) *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** denotes significant at the 5% 
level; * denotes significant at the 10% level; iii) The results are controlling for contract duration, age, tenure, working 
hours, schooling, number of adults and children, marital and health status; iv) The reference individual has a 
permanent contract, is married, is a high skill white collar worker, has a good health status, average income, age, 
tenure, hours of work, years of schooling, number of adults and children at home and is exposed to average 
offshoring levels.  
more intense during economic downturns. In Figure 1, we depict the evolution of the offshoring 
variable over the sample period, discriminating between manufacturing and services activities. 
Offshoring intensity i) rose over the period, at an average yearly rate of 1.9%; ii) this increase 
was slightly higher in services activities (2.0%) than in manufacturing activities (1.8%); iii) 
increased at a higher rate during the pre-crisis (2000–2007) period than during the crisis (2008–
2013) period (2.5% against 1.1% in yearly terms). 
To explore whether these variations affect workers differently depending on the economic 
cycle, we define a dummy variable that takes value one if the yearly observation corresponds to 
the crisis period (2008–2013) and zero otherwise, and interact this variable with offshoring 
intensity and temporary contracts.11 This full set of interactions terms allows us to examine 
whether the effects of offshoring are more intense during critical periods and whether temporary 
workers are more or less sensitive to this cyclical effect. The results, reported in Table 8, show 
that even after including industry controls, JS is more sensitive to offshoring intensity during an 
economic crisis. This is an interesting result, insofar as it suggests that the offshoring-JS 
relationship is asymmetric and dependent upon the business cycle. This notion is confirmed by 
the last two columns of Table 8. These show that increases in offshoring intensity affect JI 
negatively during economic declines. We interpreted the benchmark estimates reported in the 
previous section as evidence that offshoring shocks do not lead to job separations, and  
 
_________________________ 
11 A more restricted crisis period, 2008–2010, when average Germany’s GDP growth rate was relatively lower, 
produced similar results. These estimations are available upon request.  
coefficient t coefficient t coefficient t coefficient t
Ln(Income) 0.128 *** 9.49 0.131 *** 9.67 0.006 1.08 0.005 0.99
Temporary 0.004 0.08 0.016 -0.31 0.133 *** 6.68 0.135 *** 6.72
Offshoring 0.013 0.81 -0.022 -0.73 0.006 1.05 -0.006 -0.57
Offshoring × crisis -0.063 *** -5.10 -0.060 *** -4.88 0.023 *** 5.05 0.023 *** 4.97
Offshoring × temporary -0.007 -0.29 0.006 0.24 0.000 -0.05 -0.001 -0.12
Offshoring × temporary × crisis 0.014 1.22 0.012 1.07 -0.012 -0.88 -0.012 -0.86
Offshoring × low skilled white collar -0.024 *** -3.57 -0.021 *** -3.20 -0.001 -0.53 -0.001 -0.58
Offshoring × high skilled blue collar -0.032 *** -3.75 -0.036 *** -4.15 0.001 0.27 0.001 0.31
Offshoring × low skilled blue collar -0.040 *** -4.59 -0.042 *** -4.82 0.000 0.12 0.000 0.05
Control for crisis period yes yes yes yes
Fixed effect industry no yes no yes
Fixed effect year yes yes yes yes
Fixed effect state yes yes yes yes
R2 - within 0.041 0.042 0.026 0.026
No. of obs 69,733 69,733 69,733 69,733
Job satisfaction Job insecurity
Model 2a Model 2b Model 2a Model 2b 
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Figure 1. Evolution of offshoring intensity between 2000 and 2013 
 
Source: German SOEP 2000–2013 waves and own calculations 
suggested that workers performing offshorable tasks may suffer from wage cuts instead of job 
separations. However, the results in Table 8 indicate that this is only the case during recovery 
periods or, in other words, that offshoring shocks during economic declines are perceived as a 
real threat by workers.  
Table 8. Job satisfaction, job insecurity, offshoring and economic crisis 
 
Notes: i) Source: GSOEP 2000–2013 waves; ii) *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** denotes significant at the 5% 
level; * denotes significant at the 10% level; iii) The results are controlling for contract duration, age, tenure, working 
hours, schooling, number of adults and children, marital and health status; iv) The reference individual has a 
permanent contract, is married, is a high skill white collar worker, has a good health status, average income, age, 
tenure, hours of work, years of schooling, number of adults and children at home and is exposed to average 








2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Offshoring Intensity - All sectors Ofshoring intensity - Manufacturing
Offshoring intensity - Services
coefficient t coefficient t coefficient t coefficient t
Ln(Income) 0.128 *** 9.49 0.131 *** 9.67 0.006 1.08 0.005 0.99
Temporary 0.004 0.08 0.016 -0.31 0.133 *** 6.68 0.135 *** 6.72
Offshoring 0.013 0.81 -0.022 -0.73 0.006 1.05 -0.006 -0.57
Offshoring × crisis -0.063 *** -5.10 -0.060 *** -4.88 0.023 *** 5.05 0.023 *** 4.97
Offshoring × temporary -0.007 -0.29 0.006 0.24 0.000 -0.05 -0.001 -0.12
Offshoring × temporary × crisis 0.014 1.22 0.012 1.07 -0.012 -0.88 -0.012 -0.86
Offshoring × low skilled white collar -0.024 *** -3.57 -0.021 *** -3.20 -0.001 -0.53 -0.001 -0.58
Offshoring × high skilled blue collar -0.032 *** -3.75 -0.036 *** -4.15 0.001 0.27 0.001 0.31
Offshoring × low skilled blue collar -0.040 *** -4.59 -0.042 *** -4.82 0.000 0.12 0.000 0.05
Control for crisis period yes yes yes yes
Fixed effect industry no yes no yes
Fixed effect year yes yes yes yes
Fixed effect state yes yes yes yes
R2 - within 0.041 0.042 0.026 0.026
No. of obs 69,733 69,733 69,733 69,733
Job satisfaction Job insecurity
Model 2a Model 2b Model 2a Model 2b 
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Table 9. Job satisfaction, job insecurity and offshoring, by gender 
 
Notes: i) Source: GSOEP 2000–2013 waves; ii) *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** denotes significant at the 5% 
level; * denotes significant at the 10% level; iii) The results are controlling for contract duration, age, tenure, working 
hours, schooling, number of adults and children, marital and health status; iv) The reference individual has a 
permanent contract, is married, is a high skill white collar worker, has a good health status, average income, age, 
tenure, hours of work, years of schooling, number of adults and children at home and is exposed to average 
offshoring levels.  
The results in Table 8 also confirm the previous finding that there are no significant 
differences among temporary and permanent workers regarding the offshoring effect, even after 
controlling for the economic cycle. The fact that the effect of offshoring upon JS differs among 
the different categories of workers is also robust to the inclusion of controls for the economic 
cycle.  
Our fifth robustness check consists in presenting separate results by gender to examine 
whether men and women are affected to different extents by offshoring. The results in Table 9 
correspond to the  model  with the full  set of industry  controls (2b). We do not find remarkable 
differences across genders. The results confirm substantial heterogeneity among the different 
categories of workersin response to, with high skilled white collars being the unique category 
unaffected by offshoring regardless of the gender. Still, we find that differences across 
categories of workers are larger among women, with women in blue-collar occupations being 
more severely affected by offshoring activities. In terms of JI, the results are almost identical 
across genders and broadly supportive of the general result that JI is not dependent upon 
offshoring activities.  
Finally, the large sets of controls and fixed effects included in Models 1b and 2b 
substantially mitigate concerns with omitted variables. Still, the results may be misleading if 
workers sort across industries based on their JS or JI and in anticipation changes in the 
offshoring intensity. If workers less satisfied with their jobs or more insecure at their jobs sort 
into less trade exposed industries, then the estimates reported so far would be downward biased; 
the opposite sorting pattern would instead induce an upward bias. To shed light on the patterns 
and implications of worker sorting, we examine industry switching in our data. In a given year, 
approximately 15% of workers change for a job in another industry, and only 50.7% of 
individuals remain always in the same industry. We start by studying whether industry 
switching is correlated with changes in offshoring intensity. To this purpose, for each worker, 
coefficient t coefficient t coefficient t coefficient t
Ln(Income) 0.137 *** 7.21 0.133 *** 6.84 0.001 0.16 0.005 0.63
Offshoring -0.003 -0.07 -0.028 -0.66 0.001 0.03 -0.002 -0.16
Offshoring × low skilled white collar -0.023 ** -2.26 -0.023 ** -2.48 -0.008 -0.66 0.003 0.79
Offshoring × high skilled blue collar -0.028 *** -2.92 -0.083 *** -4.00 0.000 -0.11 0.005 0.66
Offshoring × low skilled blue collar -0.034 *** -3.25 -0.066 *** -4.05 -0.002 -0.50 0.003 0.46
   
Fixed effect industry yes yes yes yes
Fixed effect year yes yes yes yes
Fixed effect state yes yes yes yes
R2 - within 0.044 0.049 0.036 0.036
No. of obs 36,483 33,250 36,483 33,250
Job satisfaction Job insecurity
Men Women Men Women
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we compute the year-to-year change in offshoring intensity (ΔO), based on her industries of 
employment at t and t–1. For industry stayers, ΔO only reflects variation in offshoring intensity 
within the same industry, whereas for industry switchers it captures the additional change due to 
the switch. Then, we regress ΔO on a dummy equals to 1 for workers who always remain in the 
same industry (‘stayers’). The results are reported in the first column of Table 10. We find a 
small and not statistically significant coefficient, suggesting that a worker who switches 
industry does not experience a significantly different change in offshoring intensity compared to 
a worker who remains in the same industry. Next, we look for differential patterns of correlation 
between ΔO and the lag value of JS for stayers and switchers separately. The next columns of 
Table 10 show virtually no relation between the two variables, for any group of workers. In 
other words, industry switching is largely independent of the interplay between JS and changes 
in offshoring intensity. In the last two columns, we proceed likewise with JI. In this case, JI at 
time t–1 does not predict ΔO at time t among switchers. Therefore, we must reject the 
hypothesis that workers that are more insecure sort into industries with less offshoring intensity. 
Still, the coefficient among stayers is statistically significant, a result that suggests that reported 
JI may reflect anticipation effects related with future increasing offshoring.  
Table 10. Cross-industry sorting, offshoring, job satisfaction and job insecurity 
 
Notes: i) Source: GSOEP 2000–2013 waves; ii) ** denotes significant at the 5% level. 
6 Conclusions 
This paper examines the link between offshoring, job satisfaction and job insecurity. The results 
are based on micro data from the 2000–2013 waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel 
(GSOEP) and information from the Trade in Value Added (TiVA) database from the OCDE. 
Merging the two datasets using industry as matching criterion allowed us to estimate a set of JS 
and JI equations where the offshoring intensity within the industry where the individual works 
was the crux of our analysis.  
Offshoring was found to be negatively associated with JS. This effect differed among 
categories of workers, with high skill white-collar workers being mostly unaffected by 
offshoring and low skill blue-collar workers exhibiting the largest negative effects. These 
differences and the offshoring effect were found to be relatively larger in manufacturing 
industries. 
coefficient t coefficient t coefficient t coefficient t coefficient t
Stayer 0.005 1.37
JSt-1 -0.002 -1.000 0.000 0.100
JIt-1 0.013 ** 2.070 -0.002 -0.310
R2 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. of obs 30,939 13,601 17,079 13,601 17,079
Stayers SwitchersAll sample Switchers Stayers
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The results also indicate that offshoring intensity is not significantly associated with 
increased JI, a results that holds for all workers’ categories. Discriminating between manu-
facturing and services activities, we found that the extent of heterogeneity and the offshoring 
effect is relatively larger in manufacturing industries. We also found that the effect of offshoring 
intensity upon job satisfaction is more negative and significant in periods of economic decline. 
In fact, increases in offshoring intensity can lead to significantly higher job risks during periods 
of economic decline.   
Our conjecture for this result is that offshoring may induce restructuration and changes at 
the job level that are quite demanding for workers and affect job satisfaction. However, these 
changes may guarantee the future of the jobs in a convincing manner, maintaining the prospects 
of unemployment unaltered.  
The paper’s main findings were robust to several sensitivity checks. We found no significant 
differences among temporary and permanent workers regarding the offshoring effect, meaning 
that in our data the consequences of offshoring are not related with the personal risk of losing 
the job but with the overall perception of the internationalization of the sector and its 
consequences on unobserved job conditions. We also examined to what extent worker sort 
across industries based on their previous JS or JI and in anticipation of changes in the offshoring 
intensity. Workers’ sorting could bias the estimates of offshoring downwards. Offshoring does 
not seem to affect worker sorting. 
Previous research has found small but significant effects of trade exposure on 
unemployment transitions (Bachmann and Braun, 2011, Görg and Görlich, 2012, Görg and 
Görlich, 2015). The divergence with our results mays be explained by the fact that we rely on 
the job insecurity perceived by workers, and not on objective labour market transitions. In fact, 
this divergence may be indicative of two things. Firstly, objective indicators may be poorly 
related to workers’ perceptions, insofar as workers have first-hand information regarding their 
personal conditions, intentions and motivations. Individuals may not process objective 
transitions to unemployment as a realized risk if the individual has anticipated the event, or if it 
occurred due to decisions consciously taken by the individual. Secondly, despite having 
privileged information about their personal life and conditions, individuals may be unaware of 
the events at the firm, regional and country level that affect their true unemployment 
probability. Personal wellbeing is well known as being more dependent on ex-ante individual 
perceptions than on ex-ante objective hazards. In terms of public support to free trade, or wage 
bargaining, what arguably matters most are subjective concerns about job security. This is a 
question for future research is to test for explanations that can reconcile the results under the 
objective and the subjective approach.  
From a policy point of view, our findings support partially the notion that globalisation 
would be a source of important dissatisfaction and negative feelings at the workplace, at least 
for German workers. Even if offshoring is not perceived as increasing job loss risks, low skill 
blue-collar workers feel less satisfied at their job when offshoring increases. In the absence of 
more accurate information about climate at the workplace, we observe that JS deteriorates with 
offshoring even if it does not translate into a perception of job loss risk. The fact that low 
skilled, and in particular blue-collar workers, are more affected by offshoring calls for a need of 
policies that facilitate the adaptation of this group. In this respect, the promotion of training 
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policies oriented towards the acquisition of skills and credentials that are valuable at the 
international level could be of special importance.  
Whether our results can be safely extrapolated to other countries depends on various 
considerations. It seems clear that the functioning of the labour market in European countries is 
clearly different from the US (Liu and Trefler, 2011, Baumgarten, 2015). Savsin and Akay 
(2020) explicitly compare the effects of offshoring on well-being measures obtained for 
Germany with the ones obtained for similar time periods for the UK and Australia, and find 
similar results. According to TIVA (2016), the magnitude of offshoring among Germany and 
other European countries is comparable:  Foreign value added in exports represented in 2000 
and in 2011 respectively, 20.1% and 25.6% in Germany, 23.2% and 27.6% in EU-15 and 23.6 
and 28.4 in EU-28. Under the light of Crinó’s (2009) survey, it is difficult to compare national 
results because of different methodologies in the relevant measures but, overall, the effects 
reported in Europe tend to go in the same direction even if the magnitude of the effects differs 
by country.  
Our research could be extended in several directions. A promising avenue would be to 
distinguish among destinations of offshoring. In a paper very related to ours, Geishecker et al 
(2012) find that offshoring to low-wage countries raises job loss fears whilst offshoring towards 
high-wage countries reduces job loss fears, the two effects being very similar in magnitude. 
Similarly, we found evidence to suggest that the JS of individuals working in manufacturing 
activities is more sensitive to offshoring intensity than the JS of workers from the service sector. 
However, service offshoring is growing, especially in business services that complement the 
fabrication process of manufacturing products. These complex changes deserve further 
attention. Finally, our approximation of workers’ categories could also be refined to take into 
account the nature of the tasks performed and to what extent they are offshorable.  
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Table A1. Correspondence between NACE and TiVA industries. 
Tiva label_tiva nace label_nace 
D01T03 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1 Agriculture, hunting and related service activities 
D01T03 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 2 Forestry, logging and related service activities 
D01T03 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 5 Fishing, operation of fish hatcheries and fish farms 
D05T06 Mining and extraction of energy producing 
products 
10 Mining of coal and lignite 
D05T06 Mining and extraction of energy producing 
products 
11 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 
D09 Mining support service activities 12 Mining of uranium and thorium ores 
D07T08 Mining and quarrying of non-energy 
producing products 
13 Mining of metal ores 
D07T08 Mining and quarrying of non-energy 
producing products 
14 Other mining and quarrying 
D10T12 Food products, beverages and tobacco 15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 
D10T12 Food products, beverages and tobacco 16 Manufacture of tobacco products 
D13T15 Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and 
related products 
17 Manufacture of textiles 
D13T15 Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and 
related products 
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel 
D13T15 Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and 
related products 
19 Tanning and dressing of leather 
D16 Wood and products of wood and cork 20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and 
cork, except furniture 
D17T18 Paper products and printing 21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 
D17T18 Paper products and printing 22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded 
media 
D19 Coke and refined petroleum products 23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products 
and nuclear fuel 
D20T21 Chemicals and pharmaceutical products 24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
D22 Rubber and plastic products 25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
D23 Other non-metallic mineral products 26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 
products 
D24 Basic metals 27 Manufacture of basic metals 
D25 Fabricated metal products 28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 
D28 Machinery and equipment, nec 29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
D26 Computer, electronic and optical products 30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers 
D27 Electrical equipment 31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and 
apparatus n.e.c. 
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D26 Computer, electronic and optical products 32 anufacture of radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 
D26 Computer, electronic and optical products 33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks 
D29 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers 
D30 Other transport equipment 35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 
D31T33 Other manufacturing; repair and 
installation of machinery and equipment 
36 Manufacture of furniture 
D31T33  37 Recycling 
D35T39 Electricity, gas, water supply, sewerage, 
waste and remediation services 
40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 
D35T39 Electricity, gas, water supply, sewerage, 
waste and remediation services 
41 Collection, purification and distribution of water 
D41T43 Construction 45 ConstructionM 
D45T47 Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles 
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles 
D45T47 Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles 
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles 
D45T47 Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles 
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
D55T56 Accomodation and food services 55 Hotels and restaurants 
D49T53 Transportation and storage 60 Land transport 
D49T53 Transportation and storage 61 Water transport 
D49T53 Transportation and storage 62 Air transport 
D49T53D69T82 Transportation and storage 63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities 
D61 Telecommunications 64 Post and telecommunications 
D64T66 Financial and insurance activities 65 Financial intermediation, except insurance and 
pension funding 
D64T66 Financial and insurance activities 66 Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory 
social security 
D64T66 Financial and insurance activities 67 Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 
D68 Real estate activities 70 Real estate activities 
D69T82 Other business sector services 71 Renting of machinery and equipment without 
operator and of personal and household goods 
D62T63 IT and other information services 72 Computer and related activities 
D69T82 Other business sector services 73 Research and development 
D69T82 Other business sector services 74 Other business activities 
D84 Public admin. and defence; compulsory 
social security 
75 Public administration and defence 
D85 Education 80 Education 
D86T88 Human health and social work 85 Health and social work 
D35T39 Electricity, gas, water supply, sewerage, 90 Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar 
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waste and remediation services activities 
D90T96 Arts, entertainment, recreation and other 
service activities 
91 Activities of membership organizations n.e.c. 
D58T60D90T96 Publishing, audiovisual and broadcasting 
activities 
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 
D90T96 Arts, entertainment, recreation and other 
service activities 
93 Other service activities 
D97T98 Private households with employed persons 95 Private households with employed persons 
 
